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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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28 JULY 1971

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
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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*



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**Confidential**

28 JULY 1971  
(VOL. XXII, NO. 30)

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FBIS TRENDS

28 JULY 1971

## CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . 1

## INDOCHINA

DRV, Front Continue to Show Pique Over Sino-U.S. Developments . . . 1  
 USSR Cites Support for DRV, Replays Polemical Hanoi Comment . . . 4  
 Peking Sustains Support for PRG Seven-Point Peace Proposal . . . 5  
 Allies Scored for Reaction to PRG Plan, Pressing of Cease-fire . . 7  
 DRV, PRG Comment Advocates Using Elections to Undermine Thieu . . 10  
 Media Laud "Victories" in Cambodia During 1970-71 Dry Season . . 12  
 DRV Leaders, Media Mark Wounded Soldiers and War Heroes Day . . . 13  
 Anniversary of Lao Agreements Observed in Standard Fashion . . . 14

## SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

Peking Decries Remarks by Laird Following Asian Tour . . . . . 16  
 Aleksandrov in PRAVDA Conveys Apprehension over Nixon Trip . . . 18  
 Tirana Betrays Disquiet on Course of U.S.-PRC Relations . . . . 20  
 Havana Adopts Noncommittal Stance on Nixon PRC Visit . . . . . 21

## CASTRO ON LATIN AMERICA

Supports Multiple Tactics in Uruguay, Including Elections . . . . 25  
 Welcomes Trends in Peru, Examines "Delicate" Bolivian Case . . . 27

## SUDAN

TASS Deplores "Repression" of Communists After Countercoup . . . 30

## ICELAND

Moscow Applauds New Regime's Move to Phase Out NATO Base . . . . 36

## CEMA MEETING

Moscow Resurfaces "Joint Plan" Concept in Advance Propaganda . . 38

## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Politburo Member Voronov Removed from RSFSR Premiership . . . . 40

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: DISSENSION OVER ECONOMIC PLANNING  
 PRIORITIES IN CHINA . . . . . S 1

CONFIDENTIAL

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FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- i -

## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 19 - 25 JULY 1971

Moscow (3088 items)

Indochina	(6%)	14%
[Solidarity Day & Geneva Agreements Anniversary]	(--)	8%
UAR National Day	(--)	7%
Polish Liberation Anniversary	(--)	6%
International Film Festival, Moscow	(1%)	4%
China	(4%)	4%
Soviet Navy Day	(--)	3%

Peking (1262 items)

Domestic Issues	(25%)	33%
Indochina	(4%)	30%
[Geneva Agreements Anniversary]	(--)	15%
[Sihanouk in DPRK]	(--)	7%
Secretary Laird's Asian Tour	(1%)	4%
Algerian Foreign Minister in PRC	(--)	4%
Chilean Earthquake	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 1 -

## INDOCHINA

Vietnamese communist propaganda has continued to display pique over the 15 July announcement of the President's planned trip to Peking. While still failing to make any explicit reference to the Sino-U.S. development, propagandists complain that the President is pursuing his "aggressive" Vietnamization policy, Nixon Doctrine, and "peace tricks" instead of responding positively to the 1 July PRG peace proposal. A NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 25th in pressing the PRG proposal--particularly point one on U.S. withdrawal and the release of prisoners in 1971--seemed clearly to allude to the Peking visit when it said the PRG proposal is "the way out for the President, and nowhere else."

Since the President's projected Peking trip was announced, Moscow media have pointedly played up Soviet aid to the Vietnamese, and both the radio and press have publicized the flurry of items in which Hanoi has evinced its misgivings. Both the authoritative 25 July PRAVDA article on the President's trip, attributed to I. Aleksandrov, and a PRAVDA editorial of the 27th pegged to Vietnam solidarity month quote from Vietnamese communist comment in this regard.

Following Peking's re-endorsement of the PRG proposal in the 20 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial marking the anniversary of the Geneva agreements, support was again proffered by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien at a banquet on the 25th. Peking media have for the most part ignored Hanoi's propaganda deriding U.S. attempts to split the socialist countries. However, NCNA did carry the 21 July DRV Foreign Ministry statement, pegged to the Geneva agreements anniversary, including the passage charging that the U.S. "imperialists" have "resorted to insidious tricks to sow division among the socialist countries in an attempt to pressure the Vietnamese people into accepting their conditions."

## DRV, FRONT CONTINUE TO SHOW PIQUE OVER SINO-U.S. DEVELOPMENTS

The flurry of items betraying Vietnamese communist disquiet over Sino-U.S. developments, beginning with the 15 July NHAN DAN editorial, continued during the past week. In its third editorial in four days, NHAN DAN on the 22d pursued its attack

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 2 -

on "the new global strategy of the United States known as the Nixon Doctrine." It said again that the Vietnamization plan,\* "the first offspring of the Nixon Doctrine," is being defeated by the staunch struggle of the Vietnamese people.

Echoing earlier propaganda, the editorial of the 22d said one of the main aims of the Nixon Doctrine is to sow discord among socialist countries. Declaring that in "the present situation" the United States "can decidedly never materialize its dark designs," the editorial led off a series of rhetorical questions by asking "How can Nixon divide the peoples of the socialist countries who share the common ideal of communism and conduct a common struggle against imperialism?"

Some other current propaganda, however, despite its polemical overtones, stops short of charging the United States with attempting to divide the socialist countries. For example, in a speech on the 20th marking the 25th anniversary of the trade union organization, Hoang Quoc Viet, president of the organization, fell back on the standard DRV pledge "to constantly contribute to strengthening solidarity with fraternal socialist countries and uniting communist parties . . . ." And a 20 July editorial in the Front paper GIAI PHONG on the occasion of the Geneva agreements anniversary, as carried by LPA in English on the 23d, in defining the Nixon Doctrine said it was aimed at sowing division among "various" countries and did not specify socialist.

However, both the remarks by Hoang Quoc Viet and the editorial contained elements similar to earlier propaganda. Viet, for example, routinely demanded that the President respond to the 1 July PRG proposal and said that "the era when the imperialists can rule the roost and when big powers can intimidate small countries is a thing of the past." Viet also may have been alluding to U.S. China policy when he ridiculed the President's "bragging" about efforts to search for peace "not only for this generation but also for coming generations," and went on

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\* Persistent claims in the propaganda that the allied policies of Vietnamization and pacification have been effectively foiled or defeated are currently highlighted in an unusual series of Hanoi panel discussions. Hanoi radio on 26 July began broadcasting the series of discussions between editors of the radio and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in which it is claimed that 1971 was a key year for the allies to test their policies but that all their plans failed.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 3 -

to deride the President's talk "about establishing friendly relations with all countries." And the editorial said that the Nixon Administration "has intensified its perfidious diplomatic activities in the hope of pressuring Vietnam into accepting a solution on its terms." This latter charge also appeared in a 22 July PRG Foreign Ministry statement marking the Geneva agreements anniversary.

Undertones of Hanoi's misgivings also appeared in a speech by Nguyen Xien, secretary general of the Vietnam Socialist Party, on the occasion of the party's 25th anniversary. Xien said that not only had the U.S. "imperialists" failed to respond to the PRG initiative, but they "have endeavored to make unrealistic peace propaganda trips in order to continue the real war in Indo-China."

The NHAN DAN editorial on the 22d was particularly vitriolic toward the President when it, said: "Richard Nixon is the worst anticommunist, bellicose, and reactionary element. In more than 20 years as senator and vice president he always proved to be a frenzied anticommunist, advocating settling international problems by force . . . ." The QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 20th had referred similarly but more cryptically to the President as "a renowned, long-standing anticommunist," and the NHAN DAN editorial on the same day called the "Nixon clique" the "most vicious anticommunist force."

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FEIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 4 -

## USSR CITES SUPPORT FOR DRV, REPLAYS POLEMICAL HANOI COMMENT

TASS and PRAVDA as well as Moscow radio have been carrying summaries of much of the DRV and PRG comment expressing anxiety over the President's planned trip to Peking, beginning with the 19 July NHAN DAN editorial and including the DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry statements on the Geneva agreements anniversary and the NHAN DAN editorial of the 22d. Moscow's reports uniformly include the Vietnamese charges that the President is trying to split the socialist countries and is engaging in "treacherous diplomatic activity" to force the Vietnamese to accept a settlement on terms more favorable to the United States. Soviet media at first glossed over Hanoi's charge that the United States is trying to achieve a compromise between big powers in order to pressure small ones. But Moscow does include this charge in its summaries of the 22 July NHAN DAN editorial, carried by TASS on the 23rd, printed in PRAVDA on the 24th, and widely broadcast by Radio Moscow in many foreign languages including Mandarin and Vietnamese. A similar passage had been omitted from Moscow's accounts of the 19 July NHAN DAN editorial and the 20 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial; the latter, one of Hanoi's strongest indictments of President Nixon's policies, was excerpted by Moscow radio only in Mandarin and was ignored by TASS and PRAVDA.

Additional publicity has been given the Hanoi charges in Moscow's own authoritative propaganda. Thus, the 25 July I. Aleksandrov article in PRAVDA on the President's trip quoted NHAN DAN's warning that U.S. policy is aimed at splitting the socialist countries. The article also cited the "U.S. press" as writing that Peking's invitation has helped President Nixon avoid a reply to the PRG proposal.

Moscow seems to go out of its way to call attention to Soviet assistance and support to the Vietnamese. It would be expected that the Aleksandrov article--as well as other propaganda--would include a routine reiteration of such support. But PRAVDA on the 27th published one of its relatively infrequent editorials on Vietnam, this one pegged to the "month of solidarity" currently being observed in connection with the Geneva agreements anniversary; although the paper did not publish an editorial on the anniversary and has not done so since 1968. It may be conjectured that the 27 July editorial was prompted by Hanoi's continuing propaganda reactive to the Sino-U.S. developments. PRAVDA had welcomed the PRG's seven-point peace plan with an editorial on 5 July, the day after PEOPLE'S DAILY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 5 -

editorially endorsed the PRG proposal; since there had been no PRAVDA editorial on previous NFLSV/PRG proposals, and in view of the timing, it is possible that PRAVDA's editorial-level endorsement was in fact responsive to Peking's on the 4th.

The editorial on the 27th denounces aggression in Indochina by which, it says, the United States is trying to implement the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization. It routinely expresses support for the various Indochinese peace plans, singling out the seven-point PRG program and scoring the U.S. "obstructionist attitude" toward it.

PRAVDA says the United States is trying to "settle behind the back of the Vietnamese people" questions related to their present and future "by all sorts of foreign policy maneuvers and combinations." In addition to quoting from NHAN DAN's 19 July editorial, PRAVDA notes the Front paper GIAI PHONG's charge that Washington's "perfidious diplomatic activity" is aimed at "making Vietnam accept a solution of the problem on its terms." The editorial concludes with a reiteration of the assurance that the Vietnamese have the "resolute support and help" of the USSR and other socialist countries and with a plea for continued strengthening of the "solidarity and unity of action of all fighters against imperialism" in backing the Indochinese people's struggle.

A PRAVDA International Review by Korionov, carried by TASS on 27 July, says "many foreign press organs" express misgivings lest the President's decision to visit Peking be used "by certain Washington quarters" to divert attention from the Vietnam war, weaken the U.S. antiwar movement, and thus create a more favorable situation for President Nixon on the eve of the 1972 election campaign. These misgivings increased, says Korionov, after the President told congressional leaders that his forthcoming visit was not connected with an end to the Vietnam war.

#### PEKING SUSTAINS SUPPORT FOR PRG SEVEN-POINT PROPOSAL

In the wake of the 20 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the 17th anniversary of the signing of the Geneva agreements, Peking continues to reiterate its support for the 1 July PRG peace proposal. However, the only elite comment comes from Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, who declared at a welcoming banquet

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 JULY 1971

- 6 -

for a government delegation from Sierra Leone on 25 July that the Chinese people "firmly support" the PRG's seven-point proposal. By contrast, Li had not mentioned the proposal in his welcoming speech at a banquet on the 21st for Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika, although NCNA carried Bouteflika's assertion that the proposal "constitutes an impetus to the genuine political settlement of the Vietnam question and provides another opportunity which should be taken for ending this war of aggression." (Chou En-lai was reported by the Algiers radio--but not by Peking media--to have "recalled the PRC's support" for the PRG proposal at a 23 July meeting with Bouteflika.)\*

Lower-level propaganda has reported worldwide public support for the seven-point proposal, including widespread congressional and press support in the United States. A 24 July NCNA report quoted extensively from statements by senators and from press editorials expressing the general view that President Nixon must seize on the 1 July proposal as a means to end the war, and it cited a UPI report that "senators 'immediately threatened new end-the-war legislation if the President rejected the offer.'" Among other foreign support for the PRG initiative, NCNA on the 23d summarized a 20 July article on the Geneva agreements anniversary from Bucharest's SCINTEIA which contended that the new proposal "provides a concrete and just plan for solving the conflict," that it has "caused extensive repercussions in the world," and that "peace-loving public opinion regards it as a political action which is of great significance and has a profound realistic and constructive nature."

Peking's voluminous attention to the Geneva agreements anniversary included, as last year, distribution by NCNA of "international reference material" on the agreements. NCNA called the United States "the chief culprit in tearing up the Geneva agreements," a charge that has recurred in Peking's infrequent references to the agreements in recent years. In a vein similar to that of the 20 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial,

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\* On 8 July VNA, but not NCNA, had quoted Chou as expressing "warm and firm support" for the PRG proposal in the context of the signing in Peking of a protocol on a supplementary military aid grant from the PRC to the DRV. The head of the North Korean delegation in Peking for the PRC-DPRK treaty anniversary voiced support for the PRG's peace plans in a speech carried by NCNA on 12 July, but Chinese speakers did not mention the proposal.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 JULY 1971

- 7 -

the "reference material" termed the Geneva agreements "an important result" of the Indochinese peoples' protracted struggle for national liberation.

### ALLIES SCORED FOR REACTION TO PRG PLAN, PRESSING OF CEASE-FIRE

The NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 25th echoed the communist delegates at Paris in saying that the U.S. representative at the talks, instead of responding to the PRG peace plan, "continues to make roundabout contentions . . . aimed at buying time, deceiving public opinion, and blurring the seven points." The media continue to contrast favorable worldwide reaction with what they depict as a negative Administration approach. In view of Hanoi's obvious pique over U.S.-Sino relations, it seems noteworthy that VNA waited until 28 July to report that PEOPLE'S DAILY had again endorsed the PRG plan in its editorial of the 20th. Peking's initial endorsement in the 4 July PEOPLE'S DAILY had been promptly reported by VNA on the 5th.

TROOP WITHDRAWAL,      The VNA account of the 22 July Paris  
PRISONER RELEASE      session said that Ambassador Bruce, still  
                             "sought to avoid answering directly and  
positively" the PRG proposal and "still refused to set a  
deadline for total troop withdrawal." The VNA account claimed  
that Mme. Binh "condemned the Nixon Administration for  
deliberately refusing to understand the content" of the  
proposal but that she "clarified some points at the request  
of the U.S. delegate." Presumably her reiteration of the  
position that the United States must end the war and withdraw  
all its troops "without posing any conditions" was regarded  
as an answer to Bruce's inquiry on whether unconditional  
acceptance of the measures in point one would mean agreement  
to the communist demands without any discussion or  
negotiations. She denounced Bruce's remark that the United  
States has long been willing to negotiate a timetable for  
"complete withdrawals as part of an overall settlement,"  
VNA said, as "use of a vague old formula to continue setting  
conditions for the withdrawal of U.S. troops and to further  
complicate the settlement of this issue."

The LPA and the VNA accounts both noted that Mme. Binh again insisted that communist "good will" was shown by the offer of simultaneous release of all captured military men. VNA gave an unusually brief account of DRV delegate Xuan Thuy's statement and completely ignored his remarks about hypocrisy on the part

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 JULY 1971

- 8 -

of the Nixon Administration in "using" the prisoner issue. Thuy said that the PRG and DRV had "made appropriate proposals." on this question but that now the Administration, no longer able to use the POW question as a pretext, "puts forward such absurd arguments as mutual troop withdrawal" and GVN capability for self-defense.

The Commentator article of the 25th, in a similar vein, quotes the President's remarks on 29 April that the United States will remain in South Vietnam as long as there are American prisoners in the DRV and that the setting of a troop-withdrawal date will be delayed until there is a commitment on the release of U.S. prisoners. Commentator says "these statements clearly mean that if we agree to release all captured U.S. servicemen, the United States will immediately set the date for the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops. There can be no other interpretation."

Liberation Radio on 15, 19, and 21 July broadcast alleged comments by U.S. prisoners favoring the PRG proposal, particularly its offer of release of prisoners simultaneously with U.S. troop withdrawal. They were quoted as saying it is now up to the President to respond to the proposal and as suggesting that the PRG cares more for the prisoners than the President does.

CEASE-FIRE      In recounting the session of the 22d, as it has done on occasion in the past, VNA obscured the fact that the allied delegates spoke first. VNA's cryptic description of their speeches was relegated to the end of the account. VNA did, however, acknowledge some of the substance of Ambassador Bruce's remarks when it said he "once again proposed a so-called cease-fire in all of Indochina aimed at opposing the legitimate rights of self-defense of the Indochinese peoples while U.S. aggression is going on and at a time when the United States still refuses to withdraw all U.S. and vassal troops from South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia." VNA did not mention that Bruce's remarks were made in the course of his repetition of the five questions he had asked last week and that he said he particularly wished to have an

CONFIDENTIAL

28 JULY 1971

- 8 -

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 -

answer to his question on whether the other side was prepared to consider taking up the problem of a cease-fire.\*

VNA completely ignored Ambassador Lam's broaching of the cease-fire issue, saying only that "the delegate of the Nguyen Van Thieu puppet administration repeated his old allegations and the so-called two-point proposal by Thieu which has been strongly condemned by public opinion." However, Liberation Radio reported the day before the session that on the 19th, "on Nixon's orders," the Thieu administration pressed for "so-called cease-fire and general elections under international supervision." (Lam noted at the session that the GVN Foreign Ministry on the 19th had renewed the 1969 proposal for discussions with the DRV on normalization of relations pending unification through elections, urging that it be discussed in order to reach a cease-fire.) Liberation Radio said that on the same day the White House spokesman welcomed the proposal but that the following day Thieu again reiterated his "four no's stand",\*\* which demonstrates the "Nixon Administration's bewilderment and predicament." The broadcast called the proposal a "trick" aimed at "dodging a response" to the seven-point proposal and "an old item of goods that Nixon ballyhooed last year"--an apparent allusion to the President's 7 October five-point peace plan, which included the call for a cease-fire.

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\* According to the PRG press spokesman Duong Dinh Thao in the post-session briefing, Mme. Binh in additional remarks told Ambassador Bruce that her prepared statement had answered his questions and scored the cease-fire call as "nothing but an absurd demand which we rejected long ago."

\*\* These are: no further territorial division of Vietnam, no neutrality, no coalition, and no legal communist party.

CONFIDENTIAL

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FBIS TRENDS

28 JULY 1971

- 10 -

## DRV, PRG MEDIA ADVOCATE USING ELECTIONS TO UNDERMINE THIEU

Vietnamese communist propaganda in the past 10 days has continued to advocate participation in the upcoming GVN National Assembly and presidential elections to discredit the Thieu regime. As early as 17 July Liberation Radio suggested that the elections might be used to change the Saigon regime in order to proceed to a political settlement.\* And the first known Hanoi comment along this line came on the 25th in a broadcast to the South which reported that the "public" urged voters not to vote for Thieu but for "those who favor peace and a government of national concord that will put an end to the U.S. aggressive war."

A series of broadcasts by Liberation Radio on 20, 22, 23, and 26 July repeats the standard communist line that South Vietnamese elections have been used in the past to strengthen U.S.-controlled "puppet" regimes. But the broadcasts suggest that the situation may be different now in view of an alleged shift in the balance of forces "to the people's advantage." Liberation Radio does not go so far as to claim that Thieu can be defeated in his bid for reelection, but it does comment at one point that "our people are convinced that if they constantly strengthen their unity, the coming elections will provide an opportunity to expose Thieu's dirty, lackey face and condemn him even more fiercely."

While not commenting directly on the merits of Thieu's opponents--Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky and Gen. Duong Van Minh--the Liberation Radio series does at one point take pains to dissociate Ky from Thieu. The 26 July installment--a translation of which is only partially available at this time--says Ky was "forced" by U.S. Ambassador Bunker to run on the same slate with Thieu in the 1967 elections and quotes him in 1968 as denouncing those elections as a "farce." Along the same lines, a Liberation Radio broadcast on the 27th, commenting on electioneering by Thieu's supporters in Kien Tuong Province in June and July, notes that "these henchmen ballyhooed about Thieu's 'achievements' while speaking ill of Ky." The report does not express any view about Ky but

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\* See the 21 July FBIS TRENDS, pages 12 and 13.

CONFIDENTIAL



28 JULY 1971

- 11 -

quotes "compatriots" as declaring that they will vote for the man who "takes into account the people's aspiration for peace" and not for Thieu. Vietnamese communist propaganda in recent months has occasionally been openly critical of Ky, but Minh has consistently been treated in a noncommittal or favorable fashion.\*

The suggestion that the elections afford an opportunity for the anti-Thieu forces is in marked contrast to the communist line prior to the September 1967 Saigon elections, when a 28 July NFLSV Central Committee Presidium statement and subsequent propaganda enjoined compatriots to oppose and boycott the elections.

The PRG may have been laying the groundwork for its current position in some of the language of the 1 July peace proposal: By explicitly criticizing only Thieu, it left open the possibility that the election of a rival candidate could fulfill the demand for formation of a new administration in Saigon which could hold talks with the PRG aimed at forming what the new proposal calls a government of "national concord" rather than a coalition government. The proposal noted that a new Saigon administration could be formed by "various means"--possibly including elections.

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\* For background on propaganda on Ky and Minh, see TRENDS of 14 July pages 3-4; 9 June page 10; and 19 May, pages 11-12.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 12 -

**MEDIA LAUD "VICTORIES" IN CAMBODIA DURING 1970-71 DRY SEASON**

Alleged communist victories in Cambodia during the 1970-71 dry season are recounted and termed of "strategic significance" in a 21 July roundup by Sihanouk's news agency, AKI, and in editorials in the Hanoi press on the 25th. The propaganda claims that between last October and June 75,000 troops, including 28,500 Saigon soldiers, were killed, wounded or captured. Communist media maintain that, all told, the "Cambodian armed forces and people" eliminated nearly one-fourth of the "enemy" fighting forces and "decimated" over one-fifth of the battalions of the Phnom Penh army. It is also claimed that 490 aircraft were downed or destroyed and that 2,700 military vehicles, including 980 tanks and armored cars, were destroyed.

The propaganda claims that major allied efforts to reoccupy "liberated areas" were thwarted and these areas expanded so that they now encompass seven-tenths of the country.\* The total collapse of the Phnom Penh government, they assert, is "unavoidable."

The NHAN DAN editorial on the 25th stresses that the "outstanding point" in the Cambodian "victories" was the "smashing" of the ARVN's Operation Toan Thang [total victory] 1/71 and the "resounding victory" at Snuol. These achievements, according to the editorial, frustrated President Nixon's desire to demonstrate the ARVN's combat ability. The paper also holds that the Cambodian "victories" reflect the consolidation of the resolve of the Cambodian armed forces and people to "become independent, to become masters of their fate, to mainly rely upon their own strength, and to stand shoulder to shoulder" with the other Indochinese people and "liberation armed forces."

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\* Last October the communists were claiming to have "liberated" two-thirds of Cambodia.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 JULY 1971

- 13 -

## DRV LEADERS, MEDIA MARK WOUNDED SOLDIERS AND WAR HEROES DAY

Hanoi marks the 24th anniversary of "Wounded Soldiers and War Heroes Day" (27 July) with a spate of comment beginning on 21 July which stresses the importance of correctly implementing the government's policies toward wounded combatants and the families of "fallen heroes" and army men.\* Propaganda on the anniversary includes a letter from President Ton Duc Thang to the wounded and the families, a 27 July NHAN DAN editorial, and editorials in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 22, 26, and 27 July. NHAN DAN reported on the 28th that Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh led a delegation to lay a wreath at a war memorial in Hanoi. For the past three years Pham Van Dong had headed similar delegations, and for the past two years instructions on the anniversary had been issued under his name.\*\*

The NHAN DAN editorial of the 27th notes that government policies toward the wounded and the families of soldiers have been carried out well in some localities, while other localities have not performed satisfactorily. An article in the same issue of NHAN DAN by Vice Minister of the Interior Le Tat Duc, reported by Hanoi radio in its review of the press that day, claims that a campaign begun last year to "enhance awareness" of government policy toward the wounded and "fallen heroes" has been "rapidly developed in most of the villages and has achieved encouraging results." Pham Van Dong's instructions last year had taken some pains to spell out the rules for payment of allowances to families of war dead and of "soldiers fighting in faraway places," and a 21 July broadcast this year said that the distribution of money to the wounded veterans and families of war dead "has been carried out better than before."

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\* For a review of propaganda on the anniversary in previous years, see the TRENDS of 29 July 1970, page 10, and of 6 August 1969, page 7.

\*\* Although Dong did not head the wreath-laying ceremony, as recently as 25 July he was reported as having received the Cuban ambassador.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 14 -

## ANNIVERSARY OF LAO AGREEMENTS OBSERVED IN STANDARD FASHION

The Pathet Lao observed the ninth anniversary of the signing of the Geneva agreements on Laos (23 July) with the usual NLHS Central Committee statement as well as an editorial in its organ LAO HAK SAT, carried by the Pathet Lao radio. After a lengthy indictment of U.S. aggression in Laos, the Central Committee statement says the United States and the "ultrareactionaries" in Vientiane have "militarily sabotaged" the 1962 agreements and have done everything in their power to prevent any peaceful settlement in accordance with the proposals of the NLHS. The statement charges that the United States instigated Souvanna Phouma to "sabotage the Paris negotiations on the cease-fire in Laos"\* and rejected all NLHS peace initiatives, including those of 6 March 1970 and 27 April and 22 June 1971. Instead, it says, the "U.S. imperialists" and "ultrareactionaries" have mustered Vang Pao and Thai troops to attack the Plain of Jars-Xieng Khoang area, "one of the two places chosen as potential meeting places between the Lao parties concerned." The statement reiterates the NLHS position that the Lao issue must be settled by the Lao parties concerned on the basis of the Geneva agreements on Laos and in accordance with "the realities of the present situation," and it calls for a response to the 22 June proposal for a cease-fire "including" an end to the U.S. bombing, to be followed by talks between the Lao parties.

Hanoi has marked the anniversary with the customary NHAN DAN editorial but thus far has not issued the usual DRV Foreign Ministry statement. Last year the foreign ministry statement was released belatedly on the 29th. The usual Fatherland Front message is also absent thus far this year. The editorial claims that Souvanna Phouma's "rejection" of the NLHS' 22 June initiative, "in compliance with U.S. orders," and mustering of Vang Pao and Thai troops by the CIA in the Plain of Jars-Xieng Khoang region prove that the Americans and their supporters in Laos oppose any serious negotiations. It declares that "the great, all-out victories won by the Lao armed forces and people in the recent past constitute a stern warning to the enemy."

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\* This is presumably a reference to the August 1964 tripartite meeting of Lao leaders in Paris.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 JULY 1971

- 15 -

TASS has reported the NLHS Central Committee statement and the LAO HAK SAT editorial, and a brief 22 July TASS commentary on the anniversary denounces U.S. aggression in Laos, praising the 22 June NLHS initiative. Moscow has customarily marked the anniversary with routine-level reportage and comment except in 1968, when it inexplicably ignored the occasion.

NCNA has reported the NLHS statement and the editorial, including the censure of the United States for failing to respond to the 22 June NLHS proposal. Last year Peking avoided referring to a Laotian settlement but provided "international background material" on the 1962 Geneva agreements, just as it had done a few days earlier for the anniversary of the 1954 agreements. There is no such material on the Lao agreements this year, although background was again given on the 1954 agreements. Peking apparently ignored the Lao anniversary in 1969, and it provided only a report of the NLHS statement in 1968. PRC media had given greater attention to the fifth anniversary in 1967, including a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 16 -

## SINO - U. S. RELATIONS

## PEKING DECRIES REMARKS BY LAIRD FOLLOWING ASIAN TOUR

Three NCNA articles during the past week have lashed out at remarks made by Secretary Laird, upon his return from his Asian tour, concerning Taiwan and the U.S. role in Asian rearmament. While the first two articles, on 22 and 24 July, were more or less routine in tone, in reacting to the Secretary's initial Washington press conference of 18 July, the third article on the 26th was noticeably sharper and more abusive of Laird personally. Peking's abuse, however, was confined to Laird, and the attacks on the Nixon Doctrine and U.S. Asian policy included no direct criticism of the President.

On the subject of Taiwan, the initial article charged that the United States was grooming Japan to take over the defense of the island but did not refer to U.S. security commitments. The 24 July article remarked vaguely on the United States' intention "to 'honor' its 'mutual security commitments' and 'treaties' 'in this area,'" but stopped short of specifying the security treaty with Taiwan. The one on the 26th directly attacked Laird for "flagrantly" declaring that "the United States' 'mutual treaty obligations' to the Chiang Kai-shek gang would not be changed."

The 26 July article also picked up Laird's remarks on Taiwan as part of the U.S. defense shield, quoting his statement that he foresees no changes "regarding the military assistance program and our treaty obligations" with Taiwan and noting that he advised against taking "unilateral actions in withdrawing or in lessening the credibility of our deterrent in that area." NCNA saw these remarks as indicative of a continuing intention on the part of the United States to maintain "its occupation" of Taiwan.

In discussing U.S. efforts to have Asian countries shoulder greater responsibility for Asian defense, the first two articles referred to U.S. and Japanese "schemes" to prevent mainland China from occupying Taiwan but went no further toward identifying China as the target against which the security arrangements are aimed. The 26 July article, quoting Laird as saying the United States "would be in a

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 17 -

very superior position . . . vis-a-vis mainland China in the foreseeable future," charged him with "blatant nuclear intimidation and blackmail against the Chinese people."

The three articles squared with Peking's standard focus on those aspects of the Nixon Doctrine which call for replacing U.S. forces in Asia with indigenous ones, reiterating forecasts that U.S. forces will of necessity be reduced in the wake of the Indochina "debacle" and picturing the United States as currently seeking "to readjust its counterrevolutionary strategic disposition" in order to "vainly try to hang on" in Asia. The articles also registered Peking's particular concern over U.S. encouragement of Japanese rearmament, and the 26 July article portrayed a more serious threat than the earlier ones did. It noted that Secretary Laird said "with relish" that Japan has "very great nuclear technical capability," although "at present 'their contribution . . . in the conventional area takes a much higher priority.'" The 24 July article had said routinely that part of the U.S. "scheme" was to "build up the conventional forces" of Asian allies and had mentioned only U.S. nuclear capability.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 18 -

## ALEKSANDROV IN PRAVDA CONVEYS APPREHENSIONS OVER NIXON TRIP

Moscow's first authoritative reaction to the announcement of the President's decision to visit Peking, appearing under the signature of "I. Aleksandrov" in PRAVDA\* on 25 July after a nine-day delay, conveys Soviet apprehensiveness about the prospect of U.S.-PRC detente while indicating a cautious Soviet approach marked by concern not to jeopardize ongoing U.S.-Soviet negotiations.

While warning that "any designs to use the contacts between Peking and Washington for some 'pressure' on the Soviet Union" are doomed to failure, the article is careful to avoid a direct charge that either the United States or the PRC harbors such designs. "The further development of events," he says, "will better reveal the true intentions of Peking and Washington." Aleksandrov reiterates the Soviet Union's unaltered readiness to "cooperate with all states, including the PRC and the United States, for the sake of strengthening world peace." But he serves notice that the Soviet party and state "will take into account all the possible consequences of the Sino-American contacts."

Aleksandrov's line of attack is to raise a credibility gap between the words and deeds of both Washington and Peking. He points to President Nixon's statement that the visit would be a "journey for peace" and "not at the expense of our old friends. It is not directed against any nation." He then notes that the United States continues its "aggressive war" in Indochina, supports Israel, and "prevents relaxation of tension" in Europe, remarking that "many in the United States" regard the China trip as a continuation of this anticommunist course. As for the Chinese, he observes that while "in words" Peking continues its anti-imperialistic incantations, its policy continues to be anti-Soviet, "splitting the anti-imperialist revolutionary forces."

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\* Aleksandrov articles appear in the same position as PRAVDA editorial articles. This is the second one on China to appear this month, following an article written for the CCP's 50th anniversary on 1 July which reasserted Moscow's ideological case while offering to negotiate a new border treaty with the PRC.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 19 -

Moscow's fears about the Sino-U.S. rapprochement are expressed clearly in the article through the proxy of foreign press sources--U.S., West European, third world, and communist, including East European party organs that had been outspoken on the possible repercussions of the President's visit in the period immediately following the announcement. Some two-thirds of the article is taken up with citations from the world press. The reactions cited by Aleksandrov center on two points calculated to impugn Peking's credentials in the international communist movement and to represent the PRC as a dupe of U.S. interests:

+ The thrust of numerous quotations is that U.S.-PRC rapprochement, which of itself would be a welcome development in the interests of reducing world tensions, is tantamount in fact to an alliance against the USSR and an attempt to divide the "anti-imperialist" front. Sofia's RABOTNICHESKO DELO is cited as asking rhetorically whether the normalization of relations is not dictated by "the intention to join forces in a definite direction which has nothing in common with a genuine concern for peace." And Aleksandrov quotes the Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH as commenting that the visit "cloaks the intention of U.S. diplomacy to split the anti-imperialist camp and, above all, to drive a wedge between the USSR and the PRC."

+ A companion theme, and a recurrent one in earlier East European reactions, is developed through quotations from foreign sources suggesting that the President's trip may hamper efforts aimed at a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Thus Aleksandrov attributes to organs of the "U.S. bourgeois press" the view that Peking's invitation will help President Nixon get reelected and will help him "elude the demands of the public insisting on a serious attitude" the new peace initiative of the PRG.\*

Swipes at the Romanians, appearing both directly and indirectly in some of the East European press comment, find a muted echo in Aleksandrov's broad reference to awareness among "political and class forces" worldwide of "the maneuvers of definite circles which would like to use normalization of Sino-American relations

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\* See the Indochina section of this TRENDS for a discussion of this and other Soviet comment in a similar vein and publicity for DRV press articles obliquely reactive to the Sino-U.S. moves.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 20 -

to the detriment of the interests of socialism, the international communist and working class movement, the peoples struggling against imperialist aggression."

#### TIRANA BETRAYS DISQUIET ON COURSE OF U.S.-PRC RELATIONS

Albanian misgivings about President Nixon's projected visit to Peking were reflected in Tirana's treatment of the announcement by the President and in Peking media on 15 July. The party daily ZERI I POPULLIT carried the brief NCNA report on the 18th, while the Tirana radio and the Albanian news agency's service in English ignored it. On the 20th, an article in ZERI I POPULLIT used the occasion of the 17th anniversary of the Geneva agreements to make the point that the United States cannot be trusted in international negotiations and in effect to warn communists not to be taken in by "the partners of the Soviet revisionists." Playing the theme of U.S.-Soviet collusion on Indochina and indicating that Soviet betrayal of communist interests extends to relations with China, the article charged that "the Soviet revisionists," by "inciting a peace of compromise, secretly preach two Vietnams as they openly accept two Chinas, as well as two Cambodias with the recognition of the treacherous Lon Nol government."

After dwelling on alleged U.S. violations of the Geneva accords under Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, the article updated its lecture on the pitfalls of negotiating with the United States: "The chieftain of U.S. imperialism, Nixon, used more sophisticated and cunning methods than his predecessors, the well-known double tactics combining brute force, pressure, and blackmail with political maneuvers, demagoguery, and deception." The article concluded with the stock indictment of "U.S. imperialism" as "the main, the most perfidious, and the most ferocious enemy of the peoples; it is aggressive and will remain aggressive."

Given Albania's political and economic dependence on the Chinese and its fears of the more immediate Soviet presence, Tirana could not be expected to go beyond such oblique expressions of concern. It has characteristically used this kind of anti-imperialist rhetoric, flaunting its own ideological purity, in reaction to moves by its principal ally to reach accommodations with its principal enemies.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 JULY 1971

- 21 -

Thus in the period of the Chou-Kosygin meeting and the ensuing Sino-Soviet border talks in the fall of 1969, ZERI I POPULLIT discoursed pointedly on the need for wariness against Soviet treachery.

At the same time, constraints dictating this kind of oblique reaction to the prospect of a U.S.-PRC detente derive from Tirana's own realpolitik--its increasing tendency to compromise ideological considerations for the sake of practical national interests. While sustaining its vocal hostility toward the Soviet "revisionists" and their hardlining East European allies, Albania has been attempting--like the PRC--to expand its international contacts with some neutralist and capitalist states. It now has diplomatic relations with two NATO allies, Greece and Italy, as well as with "revisionist" Yugoslavia.

#### HAVANA ADOPTS NONCOMMITTAL STANCE ON NIXON PRC VISIT

Cuban media carried prompt and ample news coverage of the announcement of President Nixon's projected trip to Peking, and PRENSA LATINA was at pains to emphasize Cuba's abstention from comment. There has indeed been no authoritative Cuban comment. Fidel Castro avoided the subject in his 26 July speech. But a Peking-dated PRENSA LATINA dispatch, quoting "observers," underscored the notion that Washington was the petitioner, in keeping with an emphasis on the President's announcement rather than Peking's in the Cuban news coverage. And PRENSA LATINA used the proxy of the Chilean LA NACION to suggest that the Chinese hold the trump cards in the face of an American tactical gambit.

**NEWS COVERAGE** Within five hours of the simultaneous announcement of the projected visit by the President and in Peking media, Havana newscasts began carrying accounts of the President's statement and noted that the news had been "confirmed" in Peking. In its transmission to Latin America on the 16th, PRENSA LATINA reported that the party organ GRANMA was carrying the news "on its last page, which usually carries international affairs," and that "the text of the President's speech" appeared under a two-column headline on that page. PRENSA LATINA reported the next day that the communist youth

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 22 -

organ JUVENTUD REBELDE, like the GRANMA, reported the event on its international-news page. It also noted that Havana's Chinese-language press had frontpaged the news "without publishing any commentaries," that the press, radio, and television in Havana reported the announcement "without any comment," and again--only two paragraphs later--that "meanwhile, radio and television have limited themselves to cable dispatches . . . but refrain from any commentary."

COMMENTARIES      Of the comment that has in fact appeared, one was an innocuous potboiler by a Havana TV observer on the 16th, built around the theme that the Kissinger mission was conducted in secret because the President had to go around the normal government machinery. Another, over the domestic radio on the 20th, remarked that "the other China is trembling" at the prospect that the PRC will now enter the United Nations with U.S. blessings.

A more substantial comment, in a Peking-datelined PRENSA LATINA dispatch on the 16th by Jesus Marti, said "observers" viewed the Kissinger mission "more as an effort to put the United States, now in debt in Asia, back on the positive side of the ledger" rather than as indicating "a change in Nixon's policy." For China, Marti said, "it is a fact that the United States will have to withdraw from Indochina and that victory at this moment is already in the hands of the Indochinese peoples. Another fact for China is that Washington cannot forever keep supporting the Taiwan regime." Marti concluded that Taiwan, Indochina, and the United Nations are the three key elements in U.S.-PRC relations and that observers believe "Washington will try to turn its negative balance vis-a-vis China into a positive one."

This theme was probed in greater depth in a lengthy PRENSA LATINA account, on the 17th, of a commentary in the Santiago, Chile, LA NACION. "The Washington-Peking bridge," PRENSA LATINA quoted the Chilean paper as saying, "is of more urgent interest to Nixon" with the election coming up and with pressures mounting in Indochina and the Middle East and "a growing wave of socialist nationalism" engulfing Latin America. It also quoted the paper as saying the President "is likely to take advantage of the existing ideological conflict between the PRC and the Soviet Union to further its own interests." But it concluded by citing LA NACION at some

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

28 JULY 1971

- 23 -

length on the PRC's ability to take care of itself, on the "almost certain smiles" in Peking at the fact that the ping pong team's visit preceded the President's (it was "just another of the Chinese tactics to make the U.S. contradictions manifest"), and on the PRC's advances in nuclear weaponry.

CASTRO Fidel Castro's 26 July speech contained, in a brief avowal that "we shall not make a single concession to imperialism," a faint echo of remarks in his 19 April Bay of Pigs anniversary speech that had carried pointed overtones of reaction to Peking's "ping pong diplomacy." Castro had declared in April that the President, faced with a "desperate situation" in Indochina, was "maneuvering internationally, seeking desperately to grasp something to save himself." As a result, "the old insolent and disrespectful language was discarded" and the President "almost seemed to pine for a gesture from Cuba." Evoking an invidious comparison with Peking's behavior, Castro vowed that such a gesture "will never be made."

A mixture of conflicting concerns underlies Cuba's equivocal reaction to the developing Washington-Peking rapprochement: a desire to sustain a firm posture of no-compromise with the "imperialist" United States, expressed defiantly in Castro's Bay of Pigs speech in response to statements by President Nixon on U.S. policy toward Cuba and Latin America; an abiding cynicism, expressed recurrently by Castro and in Cuban propaganda over the years, about the self-serving nature of big powers when their own interests collide with their fraternal obligations to small allies; and the pragmatic benefits to be gained, both economically and in terms of badly needed leverage vis-a-vis Moscow, from the warming trend in Sino-Cuban relations over the past two years.

CUBAN-PRC RELATIONS The current state of Cuban-PRC relations was registered in Peking's treatment of Cuba's 26 July anniversary, in particular in Chou En-lai's message of "warm greetings" to Castro reported by NCNA on the 25th. The greetings are still confined to the state level; the last Chinese anniversary message to Cuba to be signed by both party and state leaders was the one marking the 1 January 1966 Cuban revolution anniversary.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 24 -

But Chou's message is the warmest and longest since that of 1 January 1966 and the first since 1 January 1965 to mention Castro's leadership--in a tribute to successes of the Cuban people "under the leadership of Prime Minister Castro."

Peking's failure to publicize greetings messages to the Cubans from 1967 until mid-1970 registered the chilly state of relations during that period. Peking publicized a 26 July 1966 anniversary message pointedly addressed from Liu Shao-chi to Dorticos and a brief Chou-to-Castro message on 1 January 1967. It publicized no further greetings message on any Cuban anniversary until 26 July 1970, although Havana media reported receipt of brief Chinese messages in January 1968 and January 1970.

The Chinese message on this year's 1 January anniversary, less stilted than the one of 26 July 1970, included a tribute to the Cuban people's "continued valiant struggles" against U.S. imperialism. Chou now echoes this tribute and adds that the Chinese Government and people will "resolutely fight together with the Cuban people, and we will learn from each other, support each other." He had been less expansive in declaring in the July 1970 message that the Chinese Government and people "firmly support" the Cuban Government and people "in their just struggle" and wished them "new victories." Where the July 1970 and January 1971 PRC anniversary messages expressed the wish that the "militant friendship" between the Chinese and Cuban peoples might "grow continuously," Chou's current one now concludes: "May the militant unity and fraternal friendship between the Chinese and Cuban peoples live forever!"

In addition to publicizing Chou's message, NCNA recounted at some length the opening of a photo exhibition marking the Cuban anniversary in Peking and distributed a commentary hailing domestic and foreign achievements of "the heroic Cuban people under the leadership of Prime Minister Fidel Castro." Speaking at the photo exhibition ceremony, the president of the China-Cuba Friendship Association specifically acknowledged Castro's leadership both in the storming of the Moncada barracks on 26 July 1953 and in Cuba's efforts to frustrate "all the U.S. imperialist schemes."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 25 -

## CASTRO ON LATIN AMERICA

While focusing on domestic affairs in his 26 July speech marking the 18th anniversary of the assault on the Moncada barracks, Cuban Prime Minister Castro also took the occasion to carry forward the portrayal of "revolutionary" trends in Latin America that he had outlined in his Bay of Pigs anniversary speech on 19 April. His most extensive comments concerned the situation in Uruguay, where for the first time he recognized the development of an electoral front--on the Chilean model--as a promising tactic on a par with guerrilla operations. He also expanded on his ambivalent views of the outlook in Bolivia, moving from a noncommittal stance toward the regime in April to one of qualified support.

Referring warmly to the presence of Chilean Foreign Minister Almeyda at the Havana celebration and to President Allende's greetings message, he declared that the Cuban and Chilean people "today are more united than ever." He cautioned the Chileans, as kindred revolutionaries, that they "are confronting and will have to confront the difficulties of the revolutionary process, for revolutions have their price." Later he implicitly recognized Chile's economic advantages, in the context of discussing the constraints placed on the Cuban economy by the U.S. blockade: He remarked somewhat wistfully that "there are some countries with certain natural resources which can be easily exploited, and this represents a better situation" than the one that exists in Cuba.

With respect to the United States, he emphasized that "there will be no concessions of any kind to the imperialists, as was clearly stated on 19 April," and reiterated his April avowal that Cuba "will not seek conciliation of any kind with the Yankee imperialists."

## SUPPORTS MULTIPLE TACTICS IN URUGUAY, INCLUDING ELECTIONS

In a significant reversal, Castro went on record in support of a multiple-roads approach to the quest for revolutionary power in Uruguay, picturing the armed guerrilla activities of the Tupamaros and the development of a Broad Front to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI/TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 26 -

compete in the November elections as facets of an integral revolutionary program. Cuban spokesmen in the past had cited Uruguay along with Chile as a possible exception to the dictum that armed struggle is the sole ultimately effective road to power, but in late 1970 and early this year Castro withdrew the distinction. In a 1 August 1970 interview he discounted the efficacy of an electoral path to revolutionary power in Uruguay while applauding the effectiveness of the Tupamaros--a line upheld in an 11 November press conference by Cuban CP Secretariat member Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. With conditions "contrary to Uruguay's democratic traditions" now developing, Rodriguez said, that country could no longer be viewed as an "exception" to the continental pattern.

Cuban media, meanwhile, were reporting without comment the developments in the evolution since February of the Broad Front, a coalition of leftist forces including the Uruguayan Communist Party, while enthusiastically publicizing the exploits of the urban-based Tupamaros guerrillas. Havana conveyed its skepticism about the electoral front by publicizing the Tupamaros' own lukewarm support for the tactics but not the strategy represented by the Broad Front.

In his 19 April speech Castro indicated possible second thoughts by begging the question, mentioning neither the Tupamaros nor the Broad Front. Now in the 26 July speech, asserting that in each Latin American country "the characteristics are different, the methods are different," he commented that "the armed struggle of the Uruguayans is growing stronger just as the Broad Front of the Uruguayans is growing stronger" and pictured the two as operating in tandem. The Uruguayan people, he said,

seizing in various ways on all the weapons of the tactical and strategic arsenal of revolutionary struggle, are uniting, marching toward confrontation with the oligarchs, and preparing to launch a battle at the end of the year, with the support of the masses, to seize power from the oligarchs.

Pursuing this line, Castro observed that "the Uruguayan movement is developing, both the armed movement and the popular movement," and that its various parts "are developing" and its "forces are uniting" and "fighting

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIHQ TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 27 -

In the various fields." While declining to forecast the outcome, he said "there is no reason to reject the possibility that by the end of the year in Uruguay, too, there may be a popular government" in power. Castro's embrace of the multiple-roads concept thus registers a revised estimate of the Broad Front's chances for success. It places him in the position of backing the winning horse whichever way the race comes out, and it brings his stated position into line with that of the Uruguayan Communist Party--and of Moscow--while leaving essentially intact his support for the Tupamaros, held up in past Cuban propaganda as a model for revolutionaries in South America's southern cone.

#### WELCOMES TRENDS IN PERU, EXAMINES "DELICATE" BOLIVIAN CASE

As in the 19 April speech, Castro discussed Peru and Bolivia together, placing the "revolutionary" situation in Peru clearly ahead of Bolivia's but now treating the Bolivian Government a shade more favorably than in April and expressing a new receptivity to the possibility of diplomatic relations with Bolivia.

Keying his comments to the claim that a groundswell of opinion in Bolivia favors resumption of official Cuban-Bolivian relations, Castro dwelt extensively on "this matter of relations" with Latin American nations, a matter on which Cuba "maintains a strict policy of principle." Explaining that Cuba seeks "the development of revolutionary processes" in Latin America and thus is interested in governments "with their own independent criteria, . . . capable of defending their national interests, the resources of their countries, and of acting independently of Yankee imperialism," he restated his view of Peru in terms virtually identical to those he had used in April. Cuba's policy, he said, was justified by the Peruvian Government's nationalization of U.S. oil interests, its agrarian reform measures, and "a whole series of measures which we could objectively term revolutionary." He added that "even though we could not term the process, the government, Marxist-Leninist, we could call its people objectively revolutionary." Elsewhere he commented that "the Peruvian revolutionary movement is in full swing"--the same characterization he applied to Chile.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI/TRENDU  
28 JULY 1971

- 28 -

Turning to "the Bolivian case," which he described as "particularly delicate, particularly sensitive," Castro implied that the Bolivian Government as presently constituted did not fully meet with his approval but said there are nevertheless "proper conditions for a revolution in Bolivia" and declared his receptivity to the Bolivian people's desire for relations with Cuba. Recalling "past crimes" against Bolivian progressives--in particular the treatment of Che Guevara--and remarking that "persons involved in the assassination of workers, farmers, and revolutionaries still occupy important positions," he emphasized that "some responsibilities toward history have not yet been met" and that this factor "must be kept in mind." But he cautioned against ignoring "concrete situations." Stating that "a struggle is under way between the right and the left" in Bolivia, he discerned "a profound radicalization in the Bolivian people, in the Bolivian masses," which has "tremendous importance, tremendous strength." He went on to say: "We believe that there are proper conditions for a revolution in Bolivia," and he urged the Bolivian people to "take advantage of the present situation, intensify the struggle to radicalize the process."

In contrast to his explicitly noncommittal attitude toward the Bolivian Government in his 19 April speech--he had commented that "with regard to the leadership of that [Bolivian revolutionary] process, we have not expressed our views"--he now promised that "every positive attitude of the Bolivian Government will have our support; all independent gestures of the Bolivian Government will have our support in pursuance of our policy of principles; all attitudes in defense of the national interests will have our support. . . . You may depend on Cuba's solidarity."

Castro's extensive comments on Bolivia were apparently prompted both by the presence at the 26 July celebration of a large Bolivian delegation, including members of the recently-convened Bolivian People's Assembly, and by a recent Bolivian Government review of the possibility of resuming diplomatic relations. The review had followed a virtual ultimatum from the Bolivian Labor Central (COB) to the effect that if the government did not resume diplomatic relations with Cuba, COB would send a worker as ambassador to Havana. Havana's PRENSA LATINA reported on 19 July that COB leaders meeting with Bolivian President Torres had "firmly suggested the need to resume diplomatic

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 29 -

relations with the sister republic of Cuba prior to 26 July"; PRENSA LATINA said Torres replied that "the prospects for resuming relations with Cuba were good" and that the "willingness of his government will exist as long as the Fidel Castro government also demonstrates its readiness."

Noting that workers, students, peasants, and "the popular assembly" had "spearheaded a drive for relations with Cuba" in the belief that "it will be good for the revolutionary cause" and that "it is right for the present process in their country," Castro now promised that "if this is what suits the interests of the Bolivian people," then

we here today express on this 26 July that the petition, the request of the Bolivian workers, and the struggle of the Bolivian workers, the struggle of the workers' parliament, the struggle of the students, of the peasants, for relations with Cuba, will not find a negative response on the part of the revolutionary government.

Recording initial Bolivian reaction to this passage, the PRENSA LATINA correspondent in La Paz advised his Havana home office on the 27th that Bolivian newspapers had "highlighted that part of Major Fidel Castro's speech referring to the situation in Bolivia" and quoted a number of favorably receptive comments. On the 28th he cited the Bolivian Foreign Minister as calling Castro's remarks on the resumption of diplomatic relations "very significant."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 30 -

## S U D A N

## TASS DEPLORES "REPRESSION" OF COMMUNISTS AFTER COUNTERCOUP

A TASS statement on 27 July registers Moscow's protest against the "repression" of communists and other "patriots" and the "hysterical anticommunist campaign" in Sudan following the 22 July counter coup returning Revolution Command Council Chairman an-Numayri to power. Moscow had reported approvingly, and in some detail, the 19 July "corrective action coup" overthrowing an-Numayri, TASS claiming that it was cheered by "thousands of elated people" in Khartoum. And a NEW TIMES article reported by TASS on the 21st had called the coup an "important event in the political life of the Arab world," while a LIFE ABROAD article, signed to the press the same day, approvingly enumerated the proclaimed policies of the "new Sudan leadership."

The terse TASS reports of developments in the wake of the counter coup conveyed Moscow's unhappiness with the turn of events and its dilemma in having to support an-Numayri, a friend of the Egyptian and Libyan leaders, while he was calling for "punishment" of Sudanese communists. Initial arrests and executions of leading coup figures were noted only in brief dispatches, but with the 26 July arrest of Sudanese CP Secretary General 'Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub and the execution that day of Sudanese trade union leader ash-Shafi' Ahmad ash-Shaykh, Moscow seemingly felt constrained to make a public protest. Both East European media and West European CPs had already been criticizing the "anticommunist campaign" in Sudan.

Moscow has taken virtually no note of Arab reaction to the Sudanese events--either pro- or anti-an-Numayri. TASS reported an-Numayri's closure of the Iraqi embassy in Khartoum and the Sudanese embassy in Baghdad "in view of the Iraqi Government's hostile action." But there was no elaboration and apparently only the LIFE ABROAD article, signed to press 21 July, acknowledged Iraq's prompt recognition and support of the 19 July coup. There was no mention of the Iraqi delegation sent to convey congratulations, whose plane crashed in Saudi Arabia on the day of the counter coup. Moscow has indicated UAR and Libyan stands only by briefly reporting Libya's removal of two 19 July coup figures from a BOAC plane which landed in Benghazi by order of the Libyan authorities, who subsequently "forwarded" the passengers to an-Numayri, and by noting that an-Numayri had had telephone contacts with as-Sadat and Qadhdhafi.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 31 -

STATEMENTS BY TASS, AUCCTU The TASS statement refrains from condemnation of Sudanese Chairman an-Numayri while deploring the arrests and harsh sentences against "absolutely innocent people," communists and other patriots, charged with complicity in the 19 July movement. The statement merely expresses the hope of the Soviet people that "the Sudanese leadership is aware of the danger of the road onto which they are pushing the country," a situation dangerous "for the very destinies of the Sudanese national democratic revolution." It also hopes that the leadership "will find the strength" to return to the path of consolidating the unity of all national patriotic forces and safeguarding success in the struggle against imperialism and for Sudan's social progress.

TASS routinely points to approval by imperialism and reaction of the "bloody terror and fanning of anticommunism" in Sudan. It praises the Sudanese CP's role in strengthening the country's national independence and social progress, likewise hailing the arrested Mahjub and executed ash-Shaykh as "heroic sons of the Sudanese people."

Late on the 26th TASS had carried a statement by the Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) voicing its "wrathful condemnation" of the "murder" of Sudanese trade union leader and WFTU vice president ash-Shaykh, holder of a Lenin peace prize. His execution, the statement asserts, plays into the hands of those who always sought to strike at the Sudanese trade unions, undermine the unity of the Sudanese people, and weaken their struggle for the country's progressive and democratic development.

Moscow has followed up these statements with a TRUD memorial on the executed trade union leader and publicity for protest meetings in two Moscow plants, as well as for protest statements by the Lenin prize committee, WFTU, WPC, and the Syrian, Lebanese, French, and Austrian CPs. The 28 July execution of 'Abd al-Khaliq Mahjub may well prompt further expressions of outrage and appeals for an end to reprisals. Reporting the execution, TASS said Mahjub was charged with leading the antigovernment coup and resumption of activity of the banned Sudanese CP, and had pleaded not guilty on all counts. TASS noted that although it had initially been announced that the trial would be public, it was closed after a 45-minute session.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

POLIS TRENDS

28 JULY 1971

- 32 -

The strongest criticisms thus far come not from official Soviet propaganda but in the WFTU statement, carried by TASS on the 27th, and in a Moscow worker's remarks at a protest meeting, reported in an Arabic-language broadcast the same day. WFTU described the "heinous murder" of Ahmad ash-Shaykh as a violation "by the an-Numayri government" of the UN declaration on human rights and "of statements made in the recent past by the head of government" about respect for WFTU and Sudanese trade union activity. And the Moscow worker reportedly charged the "Sudanese authorities" with having taken the wrong course and "committed mistakes which cannot be rectified, and it is possible that worse mistakes will be committed."

COUP OF 19 JULY      Reporting from Cairo on the 20th, TASS said that Major Hasim al-'Ata, who headed the 19 July coup, had declared that the armed forces would establish a democratic political system and that Sudan would participate in the anti-imperialist front and maintain friendly relations with the USSR. The new authorities, TASS pointed out, had lifted the ban on the activity of the trade union, youth, students, and women's organizations. In a Khartoum-dated dispatch on the 21st, TASS cited al-'Ata as stating that the coup was necessary because of the suppression of democratic freedoms by the former Sudanese leaders and their "serious mistakes in leadership" resulting in a deteriorating political and economic situation. The item noted that an-Numayri and five other members of the council had been arrested.

Soviet comment on the 19 July action seems confined to the NEW TIMES and LIFE ABROAD articles. The Volskiy NEW TIMES article,\* reviewed by TASS on the 21st, noted that the coup leaders stood for the ideals of the May 1969 revolution in Sudan, and observed that while the country had achieved a good deal since then, Sudan still faced complex problems which "imperialist circles" were endeavoring to exploit. Implying a Western hand in Sudanese affairs, Volskiy commented that Western experts on the Middle East doubtless had not overlooked reports of differences within the council "and the result was" that three council members were discharged last November. The TASS account does not indicate whether Volskiy identified the three discharged members--

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\* Zagreb radio's Moscow correspondent observed on the 27th that the Soviets were in a difficult situation as a result of "someone's hasty assessment of the new regime's chance of staying in power," and he claimed that the Soviet authorities had tried to prevent distribution of this issue of NEW TIMES.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 JULY 1971

- 33 -

al-'Ata, Lt. Col. Ba Bakr 'Uthman, and Maj. Faruq Hamadallah-- as the leading figures in the 19 July coup. Volskiy went on to remark that an-Numayri, council chairman "at that time, spoke about the action being taken by the left who, as he put it, turned to be the opposition." Volskiy added that Western newsmen subsequently visiting Sudan evinced satisfaction regarding "signs of a wish for contacts" in the West, but that such trends could hardly be to the liking of the Sudanese people.

An international review article in LIFE ABROAD (No. 30, signed to press 21 July) concluded with a summation of the program announced by al-'Ata, highlighting his declaration that Sudan would join the anti-imperialist front "which has friendly relations" with the Soviet Union. It noted that in domestic policy, Sudan was proclaimed "a democratic republic where 'all power belongs to the people,'" and the south was promised the right to self-government. LIFE ABROAD pointed out that Lebanese papers were publishing reports on the events under such headings as "progressive state coup."

#### REACTION BY OTHER COMMUNIST MEDIA

The Bulgarian news agency BTA on the 24th carried an authorized statement denying a report in Cairo's AL-AHRAM that day that Sudanese CP Secretary General Mahjub had received asylum in the Bulgarian embassy in Khartoum, from which he organized the unsuccessful coup. The AL-AHRAM report, BTA said, "is not in accordance with the truth"; Mahjub "has not sought and has not received shelter" in the Bulgarian embassy in Khartoum. (AL-AHRAM's story, as reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY [MENA] on the 24th, said that most of the coup leaders "were opportunists who were used by the Sudanese CP" in hope that once the party gained control "it could get rid of them." The paper cited "well-informed Sudanese sources" for the report that preparations for the 19 July coup began from the time Mahjub escaped from detention late in June; he hid inside the Bulgarian embassy, it added, and from there began his contacts.)

Prior to the issuance of the TASS statement, concern had already been expressed by the British, French, and Syrian CPs and by Polish and Hungarian media, with Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG on the 25th also remarking that an-Numayri's return to power was received with "pleasure and relief" in Libya and the UAR. NEPSZABADSAG on the 27th disavowed any intention of intervening in the domestic affairs of Sudan but nevertheless said one "must

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 34 -

pay attention to the contradictions" in the events in Khartoum. MAGYAR HIRLAP, as reported by MTI on the 26th, said it had been known that "various analyses" of the Sudanese CP's role had been made within the Sudanese leadership, while there had also been a "difference of opinion" within the party as to whether to support an-Numayri's regime.

Continued Polish concern and protests are reported by PAP, including a letter to an-Numayri from President Cyrankiewicz appealing for a halt to the "policy of persecutions." Similarly, Prague radio on the 28th said President Svoboda had sent an-Numayri a message "on the matter of saving the lives of Sudanese patriots," and the Czechoslovak trade unions have likewise protested. Calling for an end to the "repressions," the Czechoslovak party daily RUDE PRAVO on the 28th, according to CTK, declared that Czechoslovakia could hardly be accused of being motivated by anything but good will in its attitude toward the current "tragic events," and it recalled that its stand toward Sudan and the Middle East problem had been "appreciated" in the joint communique on an-Numayri's visit to Czechoslovakia in May 1970. And the Slovak trade union daily PRACA on the same day observed that the socialist countries "have been important allies and supporters" of Sudan and their concern over the situation is motivated by "deep anxieties" over the country's fate.

In what is apparently Romania's first comment on the situation, SCINTEIA on the 28th published an "editorial note" expressing "consternation" with regard to the "persecution and oppression" of communists in Sudan but refraining from criticizing the Sudanese authorities. Like other European communist comment, the paper declared, according to AGERPRES' report, that the events in Sudan could please only imperialism, and it stressed the importance of the unity of communists and all "democratic, patriotic militants" as the chief guarantee of the struggle for consolidation of independence and attainment of the peoples' progress. AGERPRES also reported that the Romanian trade union confederation had sent a telegram to an-Numayri demanding an end to the bloodshed. A GDR trade union statement has also voiced "indignation" at 'Ahmad ash-Shaykh's "murder," and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on the 28th condemned the "campaign of persecution."

Belgrade's POLITIKA, as reported by TANJUG on the 26th, mildly observed that Arab political stability cannot be insured by

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 JULY 1971

- 35 -

large-scale reprisals. The paper found it noteworthy that as-Sadat "is already rumored to be 'suggesting' to an-Numayri to refrain from his unacceptable communist witchhunt." The Yugoslav trade union council, according to TANJUG on the 27th, has protested to the Sudanese Government with a condemnation of the reprisals. Yugoslavia is the only country reported to have extended congratulations to an-Numayri on "crushing the mutiny," according to Omdurman radio on the 25th. There is no confirmation of this report from Yugoslav media.

Peking's only report, an NCNA dispatch datelined Khartoum on the 26th, factually describes developments but manages to suggest approval of the recovery of power by the "Sudanese Government headed by an-Numayri" from the "coup clique" composed of "some Sudanese officers" led by al-'Ata. NCNA recalls that the latter was removed from the Revolution Command Council last November. The dispatch makes no mention of the arrests and executions in the wake of the 22 July counter coup.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 36 -

## ICELAND

### MOSCOW APPLAUDS NEW REGIME'S MOVE TO PHASE OUT NATO BASE

In limited comment on the new Icelandic coalition government's program statement of 14 July on phasing out the American-run NATO air base at Keflavik and revising or abrogating the Icelandic-U.S. defense agreement, Moscow has likened this act of "independence" to the recent "neutralist course" taken by the new Maltese regime vis-a-vis the United Kingdom and NATO.\* Soviet comment stresses that the Icelandic decision, like that of the new Malta government, is another indication of "cracks" developing within NATO in opposition to U.S. hegemony over Western Europe.

The Soviet comment points out that where Malta, a nonmember of NATO, seeks to achieve "neutrality," Iceland is seeking within NATO to achieve a more independent position akin to that of France. Noting that Iceland is not withdrawing from NATO, PRAVDA commentator Kuznetsov said on the 17th that the new government was "only stating its desire to remain aloof from irresponsible 'operations' by the NATO military." Recalling the example of Malta, which demanded revision of its defense treaty with the United Kingdom and "liquidation" of NATO bases and announced its intention to pursue a policy of "neutrality and strengthening relations with all countries," Kuznetsov said that Iceland simply wanted to conduct an "independent" foreign policy "aloof" from the Pentagon's "frantic militarism."

TASS commentator Kornilov on the 17th, like other propagandists, cited the New York TIMES to the effect that the closing of Keflavik would "lead to the loss of an important link in the NATO military machine," especially in regard to U.S. air and sea surveillance of ships plying the waters near Iceland.

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\* See the 14 July TRENDS, page 18, for a discussion of Soviet comment on Malta's relations with the United Kingdom and NATO following the formation of the new Labor Party government on 21 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 JULY 1971

- 37 -

SILENCE ON            Moscow has chosen not to exploit the advent in  
ICELANDIC CP        Iceland this month of a NATO government in  
                     which a communist-dominated alliance is a  
coalition member. Available Soviet comment has failed even to  
take note of the participation of the communist Labor Alliance  
in the new government formed 13 July after lengthy negotiations,  
following the ouster of the previous coalition as the result of  
the June elections. Thus Moscow pictures the new regime's  
moves vis-a-vis NATO as responsive to Icelandic public opinion,  
with no reflection of the fact that the communists have long  
been pressing for such moves and calling for Icelandic with-  
drawal from NATO.

The Icelandic communists have maintained a stance of independence  
from Soviet tutelage and are on record with a strong attack  
against the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. They were  
not represented at the international communist conference in  
Moscow in June 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 38 -

## C E M A M E E T I N G

### MOSCOW RESURFACES "JOINT PLAN" CONCEPT IN ADVANCE PROPAGANDA

Stepped-up Soviet propaganda on the desirability of "integrating" the CEMA countries' economies, in anticipation of the CEMA Council session which opened in Bucharest on 27 July, included a resurfacing of the sensitive, long-dormant concept of a future CEMA joint international development plan as the eventual successor to the coordination of national economic plans. The controversial Khrushchevian concept was broached in the Soviet domestic service, in the first installment on 22 July of a new series entitled "CEMA at Work" which is slated to be broadcast on the fourth Thursday of each month. It has been raised in low key, so far for no other Radio Moscow audience. But its appearance anywhere in Soviet media at this juncture interjects a gratuitous irritant into the atmosphere surrounding the CEMA talks, against the background of the notable lack of enthusiasm with which Moscow's CEMA partners greeted the concept when it was aired in the early 1960's.

The radio talk envisaged the attainment of a joint international development plan as the culmination of a two-stage development of CEMA. The first stage would "probably include three to four five-year periods" marked by intensified coordination of national plans and production activities. During the second stage, "considerable changes would probably take place" in the mechanism of integration; the broadcast added that "according to many economists, the switchover from the coordination of plans to the elaboration of a joint development plan" would become "inevitable." As if to cushion the impact of this prognosis, the talk went on to observe that while "it is quite possible that international planning organs will be set up in the future, at present CEMA countries are interested in the first stage of integration, of strengthening economic cooperation among member countries."

**BACKGROUND** The notion of a joint economic plan had been elaborated in its most grandiose terms in Khrushchev's article on the world socialist system, written for the September 1962 PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM and printed in advance in KOMMUNIST on 24 August 1962. Khrushchev declared in that article that "today it is

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 39 -

thoroughly possible" not only to coordinate national plans but "to draw up a collective balance sheet, as it were, which would serve as a collective plan of the economic development of all the CEMA countries." The Romanians directly rejected the idea, and the media of the other CEMA member countries were conspicuously silent.

The post-Khrushchev leadership retreated to a propaganda line on "cooperation" within the CEMA framework. The term "integration" was still avoided when the 23d CEMA Council session convened in Moscow in April 1969, concluding with the release of a communique that referred only to "cooperation." But propaganda in the succeeding months began speaking again of "integration," and the 14 May 1970 communique on the three-day CEMA Council session in Warsaw stated that the April 1969 session had taken decisions on both "cooperation" and "integration" of the member countries' economies.\*

Moscow's propaganda drive for CEMA "integration" has taken on momentum over the past two years, seconded by the media of the USSR's orthodox allies and occasioning recurrent reassertions from Romania of a firm resolve to maintain its economic integrity. The new Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty signed on 6 May 1970 includes a new reference to "socialist economic integration." But the provocative notion of a "joint plan," beyond integration, has not been raised until now in available Soviet or East European comment.

In recent comment anticipating the current CEMA session in Bucharest, Warsaw's PAP typically extolled the merits of such steps as the formation of the CEMA investment bank, the special organ on legal matters, and the International Institute for Economic Problems of the World Socialist System. An article by GDR Premier Stoph in the 27 July PRAVDA referred in generalities to "multilaterally coordinated tasks" and "the balanced process of all-round socialist integration." And an article in PRAVDA by Hungarian National Planning Office Chairman Pardi on the 23d, entitled "Horizons of Integration," envisaged a "gradual" integration that would include "multilateral cooperation in the field of planning."

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\* Western press reports said the April CEMA session had taken a secret decision on "integration."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FILED UNDER

28 JULY 1971

- 40 -

## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## POLITBURO MEMBER VORONOV REMOVED FROM RSFSR PREMIERSHIP

In the most important political demotion since Khrushchev's fall, Politburo member Gennadiy Voronov was removed on 23 July from his position as RSFSR Premier and demoted to the inconsequential post of chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee.\* Judging by precedent, Voronov's new post will not entitle him to continued membership on the Politburo; and in this important respect his demotion is unlike the 1967 downgrading of Shelepin from Central Committee secretary to trade union chief.

Thus it is probable that the 60-year-old Voronov will soon be ousted from the Politburo, the first such removal since late 1964, apart from the retirement of the overage members Mikoyan and Shvernik in 1966. More importantly, the removal of Voronov, the leading opponent of the agricultural program favored by Brezhnev and Polyanskiy, may open the door for the removal of other probable opponents of Brezhnev in the Politburo such as Shelepin and Kosygin, who have already been demoted in status.

OPPONENT OF BREZHNEV Voronov's fall appears to confirm past signs of conflict between the RSFSR Premier, on the one side, and Brezhnev, Kirilenko, and Polyanskiy, on the other. It follows on the heels of recent protocol snubs for Voronov and the removal of leading Voronov allies and proteges. Voronov's decline, which began in 1968, became especially evident after Brezhnev and Polyanskiy won Politburo approval for their agricultural program in the spring of 1970--apparently over Voronov's opposition.

It was at the 23d CPSU Congress in 1966 that Voronov rose to the prominent position of fifth-ranking Politburo member, just outside the inner circle of Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgornyy, and Suslov. At the congress the RSFSR Bureau was abolished,

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\* Central Committee Secretary (for heavy industry) Solomentsev was announced as Voronov's successor to the RSFSR Premiership on 28 July. At the 24th congress Brezhnev had ranked Solomentsev last among secretaries--even below his junior Katushev.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 JULY 1971

- 11 -

depriving Brezhnev and Kirilenko of their positions as RSFSR leaders and leaving Voronov the sole leader of the largest Soviet republic.

In spring 1968, however, Brezhnev scored an unusual breakthrough by the election of his protege Katushev as Central Committee secretary, and a sudden decline in Voronov's fortunes immediately ensued. He was replaced as number five man in Politburo rankings by Brezhnev's ally Kirilenko, and he dropped to the last or next-to-last position in pictorial lineups (the first obvious instance being on May Day 1968). A few months later, in September, a Central Committee decree attacked shortcomings in the Volgograd oblast's handling of industrial cadres. The Volgograd secretary in charge of this work happened to be Voronov's old protege in Orenburg, V.A. Shurygin, who subsequently lost his Volgograd position.

Voronov's differences with Polyanskiy and Brezhnev were exacerbated in 1969 when Voronov took the initiative in his own republic, adopting agricultural policies not approved by the national leadership. The RSFSR government opened a major campaign to encourage the setting up of unregulated mechanized links and to develop specialized meat cattle production, and Voronov personally committed himself to these programs in subsequent interviews.

As the lag in livestock production became more serious in 1969, the USSR farm authorities advocated increased livestock procurement prices and costly livestock complexes as the main solutions, ignoring Voronov's campaign for development of meat cattle. Under the pressure of critical meat shortages, the Politburo--which in 1968 had refused to raise most livestock procurement prices\*--agreed to price rises in January and March 1970. Further, in May 1970 Brezhnev and Polyanskiy won Politburo approval for a costly program of building big livestock complexes\*\* and for higher investments in agriculture for the new 1971-1975 five-year plan. These decisions were announced and formally approved at the July 1970 Central Committee plenum.

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\* According to Brezhnev's report at the October 1968 plenum.

\*\* The cost of the new complexes was set at five billion rubles by P. Yesaulov in the December 1970 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 JULY 1971

- 42 -

OPPOSITION TO FARM PLAN      Voronov apparently opposed these decisions to a greater degree than any other Politburo member. He ignored the price rises in his early 1970 speeches, and in a 24 November 1970 speech he questioned their value, arguing that as long as farms were using inefficient methods resulting in high and even rising costs, "no raising of prices will help such farms turn live-stock raising into a highly profitable branch" (SOVIET RUSSIA, 25 November 1970). During the June 1970 Supreme Soviet election speeches Voronov alone among Politburo members completely ignored the decisions to boost agricultural investment and instead concentrated on the need to reduce costs in agricultural production and to introduce links, and in his 24 November speech he again downplayed the increase in investments and stressed the "enormous unused reserves."

Also perhaps indicative of Voronov's opposition is the fact that, when the RSFSR Council of Ministers met on 1 June 1970, it was Brezhnev who reported on the decisions on the new five-year plan, while Voronov did not even speak at his own cabinet session. In contrast, Kosygin reported on the plan at the USSR Council of Ministers session, with Brezhnev also speaking.

After the spring 1970 agricultural decisions, signs of disfavor with Voronov became more obvious. In June 1970 his longtime close ally and top agricultural assistant, RSFSR First Deputy Premier K.G. Pysin, was not re-elected to the Supreme Soviet. Voronov himself was slighted on the occasion of his 60th birthday, 31 August 1970. On their decennial birthdays, other Politburo members had been addressed as "prominent leader of the Communist Party and Soviet Government" and awarded the title Hero of Socialist Labor, the Hammer and Sickle medal, and an Order of Lenin; but Voronov was granted no epithet and given only an Order of Lenin, just as on his 50th birthday when he was merely a provincial secretary.

Nevertheless, Voronov stuck to his position. In a 2 October 1970 KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA interview he defended his meat cattle program and criticized its opponents. In a 24 November 1970 speech he challenged the Brezhnev-Polyanskiy policies, questioning the value of the 1970 price rises, downplaying the July plenum increases in investment, and criticizing the village reorganization program supervised by Polyanskiy.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 43 -

REMOVAL OF VORONOV'S ALLIES      Additional moves were taken against Voronov. In December 1970 his assistant Pysin was conspicuously snubbed on his 60th birthday (receiving only an Order of the Red Banner instead of the Order of Lenin he was granted on his 50th birthday, when he was only a provincial secretary). In February 1971 Pysin was retired prematurely and replaced by Belgorod First Secretary N.F. Vasilyev, a former subordinate of Brezhnev and Kirilenko in Dnepropetrovsk. Vasilyev also was a champion of the new program of expensive livestock complexes and no promoter of Voronov's programs.

Further setbacks followed. Voronov's deputy for construction, A. Ye. Biryukov, was removed in May (PRAVDA, 21 May 1971). SOVIET RUSSIA editor I.P. Moskovskiy, who had backed editorially Voronov's campaigns for unregulated links and meat cattle, was replaced by RURAL LIFE editor P.F. Alekseyev, who had ignored Voronov's campaigns editorially.

Meanwhile, Central Committee agriculture secretary F.D. Kulakov (Brezhnev's and Polyanskiy's assistant in working out USSR agricultural programs) was promoted to a full Politburo member at the 24th party congress. Subordinates of Kulakov took over the posts of RURAL LIFE editor and first deputy RSFSR agriculture minister: N.A. Zakolupin's appointment as editor was reported in the April 1971 ZHURNALIST, while N.V. Danilenko was first identified as first deputy minister in the 17 June 1971 SOVIET RUSSIA, replacing V.K. Mesyats, who was named Kazakh second secretary in February 1971.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- S 1 -

## SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

### DISSENSION OVER ECONOMIC PLANNING PRIORITIES IN CHINA

Recent articles in the PRC press have exposed significantly different approaches to economic problems in China. Certain aspects of the overall planning for China's economic growth continue to be matters for more-or-less open disputation. Sectors in which disagreement is now apparent include the issue of local versus central control and financing, the question of placing emphasis on large or small industrial units, permitted varieties of worker incentives, and the scheduling of production quotas.

In some instances the differences of opinion are made explicit, via discussion of the "erroneous" views held by "some people." On other occasions the commentator leaves implicit his criticism of an errant viewpoint; the opposing view can, however, normally be reconstructed with a fair degree of probability.

### VIEWS DIFFER ON PROBLEM OF SMALL VERSUS LARGE PLANTS

Whether to place the emphasis on establishing small or medium or large-sized plants and enterprises is a question that has been settled officially, albeit ambiguously, by the bald statement that all three must be developed "simultaneously." In recent years, however, most economic commentators have made it clear that within this framework Mao's injunction that China "should build still more medium-sized and small enterprises" must still be heeded. An article by workers of the Hantan Metallurgical and Mining Company, broadcast by Radio Peking on 7 July, argued explicitly in behalf of more small plants. The authors criticized those who allege there is an overemphasis on small enterprises--such persons "view the matter in an isolated, biased, and metaphysical manner"--and systematically controverted the claims of those who oppose the notion that more attention must be paid to medium and small mines.

For the most part, the media acknowledge the existence of large-plant proponents only via disparaging reference. Occasionally, however, a commentary will stress the need for continued development of the larger enterprises. For example, on 18 July a KIANGSI DAILY editorial called for

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- 8 2 -

efforts to be concentrated on "key factories and mines" in order to insure fulfillment of the state plan. "Implementation of state plans must be given first priority," the editorialist declared, and thus it is necessary to put "major projects" in first place, failing which "there can be no overall planning." Localities must subordinate their own interests and heed the voice of central authority, thereby avoiding "improper stress" on small, individual projects.

It is the apparent consensus, in all articles dealing with industry, that the prime need is for rapid increments in production. The alleged "Liuist" line calling for expensive, drawn-out development periods with no return is universally derided, at least by implication. The differences that do come to the fore in this area--and which may in many instances merely reflect actual local conditions--are between those who favor special emphasis on small and medium-sized plants which can be put to work quickly at little expense, and those who favor large plants already in being or under construction, the output of which can be significantly raised by new construction, again at minimal cost and with little delay. The KIANGSI DAILY editorial noted above, for instance, calls for "completing a number of projects in order to put them into operation." A PEOPLE'S DAILY article on 16 June also supported the view that large plants should be further developed; it described how a large phosphorus mine under the Ministry of Fuel and Chemistry retrenched from its orderly plan of development in favor of a "battle of annihilation" aimed at immediate production gains.

#### ORE UTILIZATION, CONSUMER GOODS EMPHASIS, ALSO DEBATED

While there is general agreement that the most basic industry--mining--must receive "priority," divergences appear on the matter of utilization of mined ores. A PEOPLE'S DAILY article on 13 June brought this clearly into focus in discussing different views on where "the main effort in industry" should be directed, to the steel industry or electronics. The article came down on the side of the steel industry, arguing as follows: It is agreed that mining must have priority; but in order to excavate and process ores new mining machinery made of steel must be manufactured; therefore steel must have priority over electronics.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
28 JULY 1971

- S 3 -

It is, of course, unlikely that any significant faction would wish to oppose Mao's dictum that steel must be regarded as "the key link." PEOPLE'S DAILY may, however, be reflecting a discussion on the proportion of steel that must be fed back into the mining machinery industry.

Those who see a danger in one-sided emphasis on heavy industrial machinery appear in recent months to have acquired an increased voice in economic propaganda. Several articles were published in late May and early June that seemed to presage increased attention to the consumer-goods sector of the economy. A radio article by Ministry of Light Industry officials on 29 June specifically suggested that future attention to light industry might require that some of the effort expended on heavy industry be diverted; it was argued that the development of industrial raw materials "requires the active cooperation of heavy industry." The importance of consumer goods production was also noted in a 12 June PEOPLE'S DAILY article by workers of the Peking Municipal Brush Factory: "Small as they are, toothbrushes are needed by the people."

ECONOMIC           The article by the brush factory workers is  
INCENTIVES       relevant also to another obvious area of dissension,  
                  incentives for workers. This was a point at issue during the cultural revolution, and attacks on material incentives ("economism") formed a key portion of early revolutionary rhetoric. In the agricultural area brief and limited experimentation aimed against private plots and sideline occupations resulted; but the center rather quickly determined that material incentives could not be entirely dispensed with. In industry the piecework system was attacked and bonuses were eliminated; and these reforms have not been so thoroughly repudiated as have the agricultural attacks on material incentives.

The articles on light industry may indicate an attempt to meet worker complaints to some extent by increasing the availability of consumer goods. The brush factory workers' article attacked those who emphasize industrial brushes and "belittle civilian-use brushes." It asserted that "the broad masses of workers" have repudiated previous management methods of "disregard for urgent market demands and failure to consider the people's interests."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 54 -

The slogan "to each according to his work" has been featured in PRC media since the cultural-revolution fervor waned, but this bow to an incentive system still seems in dispute. Problems are most obvious in the agricultural field, with comment tending to be a little more specific in this area than in regard to industrial wages. A 16 June Canton broadcast warned against those who after repudiating material incentives went too far and "did not carry out distribution according to labor but rather pursued absolute egalitarianism." On the other hand, the incomes policy advocated by an Urumchi broadcast on 11 July called forth the now seldom-heard slogan, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs," rather than distribution according to labor.

Distribution policies may be allowed to fluctuate depending on regional problems. A 15 July Fukien agricultural conference noting difficulties with drought and with morale went far more completely over to the side of material incentives than even the post-cultural-revolution relaxation has allowed: "Rewards in the form of work points should be higher than usual where the work requires more strenuous labor or greater skill." The conference also permitted the revival of the system of "a fixed quota of labor," which comes rather close to certain denounced "Liuist" deviations (Foochow radio, 16 July).

But material incentives in industry, where standards are already higher than in agriculture, may not show a concomitant new flowering. An article by the State Construction Commission in PEOPLE'S DAILY on 19 April criticized the view that construction must "show concern for the interests of the people." While the party has "gradually improved the workers' livelihood," building better workers facilities is "contrary to the policy of thrift" and just "accentuates the gap between worker and peasant," the article explained. Efforts to improve workers' living conditions were dismissed as "economism."

#### VARYING OPINIONS ON ROLE OF PLANNING MECHANISM SEEN

The State Construction Committee article points up still another of the conflicts in current economic practice: At what level must plans be coordinated and production goals set? After proclaiming its opposition to the "monopoly of management" practised by the old State Planning Commission, the article went on to suggest that today's commission may also have flaws: Autocracy on the part of the planning commission

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

28 JULY 1971

- S 5 -

was "especially true" in the past, but even now it is "necessary to reform the planning system and relegate the planning organs to lower functions."

In a 19 July article on capital construction released by NCNA, however, there appeared a bid for "strengthening financial control in capital construction"--indicating that the central planners have no intention of permitting localities to act on their own. This article, which made the first public pronouncement that the new five year plan "will call for increasingly heavy investments" in capital construction, emphasized that economic accounting must be well implemented, inasmuch as "serious losses to the state" have already occurred. While some waste is accounted for as a result of the cultural revolution--"management was in confusion" and "they spent money at will"--the major problems remain, some deriving from the belief that economic accounting is opposed to giving prominence to politics.

The article stressed that construction funds provided by the state cannot be correctly planned and distributed without economic accounting; if the state "simply hands out funds in any amount requested at any time, we are acting blindly." In answer to those who oppose the role of central financial planning, the article derided those "comrades in capital construction"--"we often come across them" -- who "cannot supply any answer to such questions as how much will a certain project cost, how much time will elapse before it can begin operation, or how can it produce the maximum economic benefit."

COMMERCE                      The role of commerce departments in the planning  
DEPARTMENTS                  process seems to have become another area of  
                                  disputation--perhaps stemming from the recent  
official denunciations of "Liu's theory" that commodity  
circulation should be utilized as a tool to plan production  
quotas. An article broadcast by Peking radio on 6 July by the  
writing group of the Kirin Provincial CCP Committee has  
strongly defended the need for the continued existence of  
commerce departments, presenting them as allies of the central  
planners. It is argued that, while demand can no longer  
govern production, the new role of commerce departments is to  
stimulate both supply and demand.

The authors complain that some "hoodwinked comrades in the commercial departments" have been misled by a few class enemies into the belief that commercial departments now have no role

CONFIDENTIAL

- S 6 -

because they cannot stimulate production. On the contrary, the authors say, "planning is of first importance"; Lenin is cited as source for the statement that "if the state does not accumulate statistics and exercise supervision over the production and distribution of commodities in an all-round way, it will be impossible to maintain political power."

For those leftists who oppose the planners' role, the article makes use of that prime teacher by negative example, the disasters of the great leap. Blaming the leftist errors of 1958 on Liu, the article pointed out that the major ideological deviation was the attempt to jump into communism by having the state take over all means of production and put an end to commodity distribution. Thus the authors manage to place the blame for the great-leap fiasco on those opposed to commerce departments.

CONFIDENTIAL